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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the .-n.,lV~"~·~ t"''J: UT•u STATE OF UTAH LIJ~ I:>. !ll '· ncJ 
NATIONAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COM- FE 8 ? ") 1967 
PAN '{J successor to CONTINENTAL REPUBLIC ..., J 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
BAYOU COUNTRY CLUB.:!Nc., a UTAH Corpora- ~(,t,\'/fL;tr~ 
tion; FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT CO., a Utah ~ 
Corporation; WESTERN ACCEPTANCE CORP.;•ik a 
Utah Co_rporation, BRYCE WADE; FAMIL~ BUILU-
ING CREDITS COMPANY, a Utah Corporatio~: 
KEITH R. NELSON d/b/a A.A.A. ELECTRIC SERt-.;''-J'' . 
VICE; WASATCH PLUMBING SUPPLY CO., a Utah . 
Corporation; STANDARD BUILDERS SUPPLY ., .. ., Co"i" ;_;.~.~ 
COM., INC. a Utah Corporation; S. F. FREDR~ Su;-,:vm 
SON & MRS. PAUL H. HUPP d/b/a HUPP RE-
FRIGERATION C 0 M P A NY formerly known as 
PAUL H. HUPP COMPANY; LA MAR KAY d/b/a QUALITY ELECTRIC MOTOR REPAIRS; EDDIE 
A. BUTTERFIELD d/b/a COOK, INC.; ROBISON 
DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC., a Utah Corpora-
tion; WETHERBEE FIXTURE CO.; WILLIAMS 
BUILDING SUPPLY COMPANY, a Utah Corpora-
tion; CLYDE V. BUXTON d/b/a BUXTON HEAT-
ING & AIR CONDITIONING; TOWN & COUNTRY 
INTERIORS; STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH; ELDRID S. BUNTING d/b/a 
SCHOPPE SHEET METAL COMPANY; INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE. OF UTAH; 
NEELEY INC., a Utah Corporation; INTERMOUN-
TAIN ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN, a Utah 
Corporation; UNITED STATES.OF AMERICA; any 
and all other persons or corporations claiming any 
~ht. title, or interest in or to the property as in this 
COmplaint described, said parties being unknown to 
plabitiff. ' 
Defendants-Respondents. 




~. Am>eal. {rom a Judgment of the Third District Court 
• ~~sm 0,- UT At-for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge 
APR2 !j 1965 ROBERT W. HUGHES and 
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY 
JOHN W. LOWE . 
LAW LliRAft.'l 1001 Wa1ker Bank Building' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
{\ttorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
NOLAN-J:-&LSBN _.-.:_ 
8138 South State, Midvale . 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Bayou Country Club 
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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
N.ArPION.AL AMI1~RICAN LJFE. IN-
~UH.ANCE CO:.MPANY successor to 
C(lNTI~ENTAL REPUBLIC LIFE 
I0I~URANCE COl\I:PANY, Case 
PlaiHtiff-Appellant, No.10138 
-vs.-
IL\ YOU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., et 
al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
~T.ATE~IENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
In an action to foreclose a mortgage on a country 
club, defendant Bayou Country Club, hereinafter called 
B..:\ YOU. counterclain1ed, asserting the loan was usurious 
and claiming forfeiture of unpaid interest, treble the 
amount of an alleged discount, treble the amount of sums 
paid allocable to interest, and an attorney's fee. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court at pretrial ruled: 
(1) Bayou did not receive value to the extent of $14,-
500.00 on a $65,000 loan, despite receipt by it of a satis-
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faction of its outstanding note in the amount of $15,000, 
executed by Bayou in favor of a third party, Frank A. 
Nelson, Jr. 
( 2) The loan was usurious. 
(3) Payments on the $65,000 loan could not be al-
lotted to principal rather than to interest. 
( 4) The amount of $14,500 was held to be a dis-
count and it, together with installment payments allo-
cable to interest in the amount of $2630.27 should be 
trebled and awarded to Bayou. 
( 5) Bayou was not estopped to assert usury. 
The trial court ruled : 
(6) The Utah usury statutes are constitutional. 
( 7) Plaintiff was given judgment on its complaint 
for $65,293.81 together with $6000 attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
(8) Bayou was given judgmen~ on its counterclaim 
for $51,390.81 together with $5000 attorneys' fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an award of interest on its note and 
reversal of Bayou's judgment on its counterclaim and 
dismissal of the counterclaim. In the alternative, appel-
lant seeks reversal of Bayou's judgment on its counter-
claim with a remand for trial on the questions of usury 
and estoppel and with direction that, in the event Bayou 
should recover on its counterclaim, such recovery should 
exclude treble the amount of the $14,500 discount. 
STATEMENT OF FACT1S 
A statement of facts which can be made based upon 
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the n·eord in this case is necessarily fragmentary because 
the ('Ourt, at a pretrial hearing, entertained a motion by 
Bayou for sununary judg1nent, made without any notice, 
and grantPd the motion without affording plaintiff an 
oppnrt unity to present evidence, despite the complicated 
factual situation involved. 
Inasmuch as all issues except constitutionality and 
amount of attonwys fPPS were decided on summary judg-
mPnt, the facts on all issues except those two should be 
considered in a light most favorable to appellant. 
This action was cmnmenced by Continental Republic 
Life Insurance Company, a Utah corporation, to fore-
close on a $65,000 note and mortgage executed by Bayou. 
Bayou was a newly incorporated corporation organized 
for profit. It was organized for the purpose of construct-
ing club facilities and selling memberships to buyers, 
who would have no equity in the facilities, but only the 
right to use them. (R. 445, p. 2-3) 
The venture was underfinanced. Mter acquiring 
land southeast of Salt Lake City, and starting construc-
tion of a clubhouse thereon, the corporation ran out of 
money. (R. +±5, p. ±) Being desperately in need of funds, 
George Padjen, Leland Olsen and Nolan Olsen, the offi-
cers and organizers of the Bayou, asked Frank A. N el-
son, Jr .. the president of the Murray State Bank, where 
the new club had its account, to find a lender who would 
lend them enough to complete their building project. 
Because of the nature of the loan and insolvency of 
the borrower, the Murray State Bank was not interested 
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in making the loan. Nelson, as Bayou's agent, approached 
Marvin Bainum, the president of Continental Republic 
Life Insurance Company, to interest that company in 
making a loan. A loan was made by Continental. A $65,000 
note was executed by Bayou. Bayou received an insur-
ance policy, $50,000 cash and cancellation of Bayou's out-
standing note in the amount of $15,000 payable to Nelson. 
There is no evidence at all as to the consideration for the 
$15,000 note, or why or when it was given, but there is 
nothing to indicate that it was other than what it pur-
ported to be on its face. Assuming there was a cancella-
tion of Bayou's debt to Nelson, as the court considering 
the matter on summary judgment should have done, 
Bayou received full value for the $65,000 loan. 
The lower court however assumed that there never 
was a debt from Bayou to Nelson, and that the note for 
$15,000 and cancellation thereof was fictitious. In the 
event this court should also assume the $15,000 note 
was fictitious, we set forth the following additional facts. 
It was agreed that there should be a note and mort-
gage from Bayou to Continental Republic, in the amount 
of $65,000 which would bear interest at 9%, but that 
$500 would be retained to pay the premium on an insur-
ance policy, and that there would be a discount of $14,500 
so that the net amount advanced would be $50,000. 
Bainum handled the negotiations for Continental 
Republic. Bainum had been familiar with usury laws of 
states which permitted such discount and it was his 
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opinion and lwliel' that such a discount would not make 
t hP loan mmrious in Utah. (R. 242) 
N P hwn, unknown to plaintiff was getting a cmnmis-
~ion from Bayou in addition to a $2000 commission from 
plaintiff. (R. ~-l-~, -!45, p. 24, 446 p. 14) The court refused 
to allow plaintiff to make Nelson a party to the suit. 
Nelson arrangPcl the closing of the transaction, which 
occurred September 7, 1961. (R. 446 p. 16) Continental 
Republ:ie made its check in the amount of $65,000 payable 
to Bayou and to McGhie Abstract Company. Bainum ex-
pected that :McGhie Abstract Company, in closing the 
transaction, would cash the $65·,000 check and retain $15,-
000 for Continental Republic ($500 for the insurance pre-
mium and $14,500 as a discount) and that Nelson would 
get a $2000 commission from Continental Republic from 
the $14,500. 
Unknown to Bainum, a $15,000 note bearing date of 
August 10, 1961 payable from Bayou Country Club to 
Frank Nelson was cancelled by Frank Nelson. The note 
was marked ''Paid 9-12-61 Frank A. Nelson, Jr.," with 
the further statement thereon "September 6, 1961. TO 
\YHOM IT niAY CONCERN: The Bayou Country Club 
is indebted to me personally, in the amount of $15,000." 
(Signed) "Frank A. Nelson, Jr." (R. 448, p. 6, exhibit 
I) Unknown to Bainum, this cancelled note was delivered 
by Nelson to nicGhie Abstract Company as consideration 
for the $15,000 portion of the loan, which Bainum anti-
cipated would be treated as a payment of premium and a 
discount. McGhie Abstract gave Nelson its check in the 
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amount of $15,000 in payment for the $15,000 note from 
Bayou to Nelson. (R. 448, p. 6, exhibit 5) What Nelson 
did with it does not appear in the record but Bayou con-
ceded that it received value to the extent of $500 for a 
premium on an insurance policy. McGhie Abstract held 
the remaining $50,000 for Bayou's account but earmarked 
part for payment of mechanics liens and other encum-
brances, so that it could issue a title policy insuring Con-
tinental Republic as mortgagee. 
Five monthly payments totalling $3876.5,6 were made 
by Bayou after which it defaulted on the loan. Contin-
ental Republic had to advance $1540.10 for taxes and fire 
insurance on the mortgaged property, when Bayou failed 
to pay for them. Continental Republic demanded pay-
ment of the note and mortgage and when the demand was 
not met commenced a foreclosure proceeding. 
The suit necessarily involved numerous parties in-
cluding mechanics lien claimants. A receiver was ap-
pointed. The receiver employed Nolan Olsen, one of the 
organizers of Bayou, and Bayou's attorney, as his at-
torney. Bayou counterclaimed in the foreclosure action 
alleging usury. 
After the commencement of the action and prior to 
this appeal, Continental Republic Life Insurance Com-
pany was merged into National American Life Insurance 
Company, which, as successor, inherited the problems 
which arose from its predecessor's dealings. 
Judge Hanson on pretrial ruled, as a matter of law, 
that there was no consideration for $14,500 of the $65,000 
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loan; that ~meh discount nutdP the loan usurious; that, in 
addition to that portion of the n1onthly instalhnent pay-
mPnts all<H·ahl<~ to intt>rest ($2630.27) the $14,500 discount 
~houhl hP tn,blnd and awarded to Bayou. He also ruled 
that I ~a you was not estopped to assert usury. He left 
two issue~ to be determined at the trial. (1) whether or 
not the usury laws of the state of Utah are unconstitu-
tional, and ( 2) the amount the parties should recover as 
attorneys fees. 
Judge Faux took evidence on only one issue, the 
amount of attorneys fees. He held the usury statutes con-
stitutional and awarded plaintiff judgment for the full 
amount of its note together with advances but with no 
inh'rP~t, in the total amount of $65,293.81 together with 
$6000 attorneys' fees, and awarded Bayou, on its counter-
claim for usury, $51,390.81, being the total of treble the 
amount of $14,500 discount, treble the monthly instalment 
payments of $2630.27 allocable to interest, and $5000 at-
torneys' fees. 
STJ._TEMENT· OF POINTS AND ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHE'THE.R OR 
NOT THE LOAN WAS USURIOUS. 
X o summary judgment determining that there was 
a usurious transaction should have been entered. 
''\\~ether a transaction is usurious is a ques-
tion of fact, unless the instrument on its face shows 
the exaction of an illegal rate of interest." Massie 
v. Rubin, 270 F. 2d 60, 62. 
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If it be assumed that Bayou received full value for 
the $65,000 loan, there would be no usury, regardless of 
how much plaintiff benefited from the loan. 
In a similar situation, where the lender benefited hy 
more than the maximum permissible interest rate, by 
virtue of receiving from a broker a portion of the com-
mission paid by the borrower, it was held that there was 
no usury because the borrower received full value. 
"Usury is not shown by the fact that a lender 
receives from the borrower's agent, as a condition 
of making the loan, half of the commission which 
the borrower has already agreed to pay the agent 
for his services in procuring the loan, although 
the amount so received by the lender added to the 
rate reserved for the loan, exceeds the legal rate 
of interest-." Mortgage Bond Co. v. Stephens, 
(1937) 181 Okla. 182, 72 P. 2d 831, 839. See also, 
Pushee v. Johnson (1936) 123 Fla. 305, 166 S. 847, 
105 ALR 789 and 55 Am. Jur. Usury Par. 71. 
So, here, where Bayou's obligation to pay $15,000 
was cancelled, the fact that plaintiff benefited by being 
able to discount the $65,000 loan by the amount of $14,500 
does not make the loan usurious. 
The record indicates that value was received by 
cancellation of the $15,000 note. There is no evidence 
whatsoever that this note did not constitute a valid obli-
gation. Neither Bayou nor Nelson has stated that no debt 
was cancelled. It was pure surmise by Judge Hanson 
that the note was fictitious. Nelson's version of the 
transaction could not have been considered by Judge 
Hanson because he did not even open Nelson's deposition. 
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lt i:-; still in it~ :-;ealed envelope Inarked "Awaiting Order 
ot' the Court." ~nnunary judgments were reversed in 
~imilar situations in Thompson v. Ford J.l! a tor Co., 14 
l 'tah ~<l :~:~-t. :~S-t: P. 2d 109, and in Schubach v. Wagner, 
1-l- Utah ~d 335, 384 P. 2d 110. Even if witnesses had 
~tah'd the $15,000 note was fictitious, there would have 
IH'Pll an issue of fact thereon. For Judge Hanson to rule, 
hy way of summary judgn1ent on no evidence, that the 
discharge of the note did not constitute consideration is 
doubly erroneous. 
''Summary judgment can properly be granted 
under Rule 56 (c) only if 'the pleadings, deposi-
tions, and adinission on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any,' which are offered, show without dis-
pute that the party is entitled to prevail. This 
condition is obviously not met if the allegations 
of the plaintiff's complaint stand in opposition to 
to the averments of the affidavits so that there 
are controverted issues of fact, the determination 
of which is necessary to settle the rights of the 
parties." Christensen v. Financial Service Co., 
14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010, 1012. 
Plaintiff denied all of the allegations of Bayou's 
counterclaim thereby creating issues of fact (R. 25). 
"In confronting the problem presented on this 
appeal we have been obliged to remain aware that 
a summary judgment, which turns a party out of 
court without an opportunity to present his evi-
dence, is a harsh measure that should be granted 
only when, taking the view most favorable to a 
party's claims and any proof that might properly 
be adduced thereunder, he could in no event pre-
vail" Kidman t'. White, 14 Utah 2d 142, 378 P. 2d 
898, 900. 
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The court there reversed a summary judgment be-
cause there were issues of fact which should have been 
determined upon a trial. The court should do likewise 
here. 
POINT 2 
THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER 
OR NOT BAYOU SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT 
USURY. 
If it be assumed, however, that Judge Hanson was 
correct in determining, on no evidence, that Bayou did 
not receive value to the extent of $14,500 by having its 
note for $15,000 satisfied, such determination must then 
rest upon the conclusion that the $15,000 note was ficti-
tious. In that event, plaintiff was entitled to show at a 
trial that Bayou should be estopped to assert usury. 
Such estoppel would result from proof that plaintiff 
did not know the loan was usurious and did not know of 
the $15,000 note, and that it was Bayou and Nelson who 
did know the loan was usurious and conspired to create 
a usurious loan, and that it would be inequitable to permit 
Bayou to recover when Bayou, not plaintiff, conspired to 
create a situation whereby Bayou could benefit by the 
forfeitures and penalties awarded on its counterclaim. 
"The acts of a borrower in securing a loan 
may be such as to constitute fraud or to estop 
him from taking advantage of the penalties pro-
vided for in the usury statutes. . . . Usury sta-
tutes are enacted to protect borrowers from the 
demands of unscrupulous lenders, and not to 
provide vehicles for unjust windfalls." Massie 
v. Rubin, 270 F. 2d 60, 62. See also Nikkel v. 
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Lindhorst, 85 Colo. 334, 276 P. 678 and annota-
tion ();3 ALR 962. 
POINT 3 
P A YMEN'DS MAY BE ALLOTTED BY THE LENDER TO 
PRINCIPAL RATHER THAN TO INTEREST AND THERE 
IS THEREFORE NO PAYMENT OF INTERgST TO BE 
TREBLED AS DAMAGES. 
If it be assumed that there is usury, and that pay-
ments of interest by Bayou should be trebled and award-
t>tl to Bayou, there is nothing to be trebled, because so 
long as there is principal unpaid, allocations of payments 
will be made to reduction of principal instead of to inter-
est. 15-1-7 UCA provides for forfeiture of all interest to 
be paid and for the recovery of three times the interest 
paid: 
"15-1-7. USURY- FORFE.ITURE OF ALL 
INTEREST- TRIPLE DAMAGES FOR IN-
TEREST ALREADY PAID-LIMITATION OF 
ACION. - The taking, receiving, reserving, or 
charging of a rate of interest greater than is al-
lowed by section 15-1-2, shall be deemed a forfeit-
ure of the entire interest which the note, bill, or 
other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has 
been agreed to be paid thereon. In case the great-
er rate of interest has been paid the person by 
whom it has been paid, or his legal representa-
tives, may recover back three times the amount of 
the interst thus paid from the receiver or taker 
thereof and reasonable attorney fees, provided 
that such action is commenced within two years 
from the time the usurious transaction occurred." 
Before applying such harsh treble damage provision-
the cases require that the borrower be actually out of 
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pocket more than he has received from the lender. To 
rule otherwise would permit a totally uninjured borrower 
to get a windfall. Until the borrower has paid an amount 
equal to the principal, there has been no injury. There-
fore, not only the discount, but also the five instalment 
payments which were made, should be allocated to reduce 
the principal. 
This rule was applied in the case of McBroom v. 
Scottish Mortg. & Land Invest. Co.7 153 U.S. 318, 328', 38 
L. Ed. 729, 733, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 852, which arose under a 
statute of New Mexico which provided that collection of 
interest at a higher rate than 12 per cent was a misde-
meanor, and which statute gave a right of action to the 
borrower to collect double the amount so paid. Interest 
notes were given upon a loan of $65,000.00 and a com-
mission of 10 per cent upon the entire loan was paid to 
the lender at the time of the transaction. After the first 
interest note was paid7 the borrower brought suit to re-
cover double the amount of the commission. Said the 
U.S. Supreme Court: 
"The contract of loan not being void, except 
as to the excess of interest stipulated to be paid, 
the question arises whether the lender is liable 
to an action for the penalty prescribed by the 
statute, so long as the principal debt, with legal 
interest thereon, after deducting all payments, is 
unpaid. We are of opinion that this question must 
be answered in the negative. While, under the 
statute, the mere charging of usurious interest 
may be a misdemeanor for which the lender can 
be fined, whether such usurious interest is or is 
not collected or received, the borrower has no 
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cau::-;p of ad ion until usurious interest has been ae-
tually collect(•J or reeeived fr01n hun. Such cannot 
bt> ::-;aid to havP ht>Pn collected or received, in excess 
ol' what Inay be lawfully collected and received, 
until the lender has in fact, after giving credit for 
all payments, collected or received more than the 
smn loaned. . . . " and, quoting from another case 
the court continued: 
"From the origin of the loan, from the re-
taining of the first discount, through all the re-
newals up to the time of final payment of the 
principal, or up to the time of entering judgments, 
there is a locus poenitentiae for the party taking 
the excessive interest. Any time till then he may 
consider the excessive interest paid on account of 
the loan, and so apply it and lessen the principal. 
Up to that time he may make this election. When 
payment is actually made or judgment is entered 
the election is made; and if, as in these cases, 
judgment is entered for the face amount of the 
notes or full amount of the loan, or payment is 
taken in full without any reduction by taking out 
the excessive interest, the cause of action is com-
plete." 
Other statements of the same rule are the following: 
". . . as between the parties to the transac-
tion, or holders with knowledge, all payments of 
usurious interest made on the series of notes will 
be applied by the law to the extinguishment of the 
debt, and this even though the parties have treated 
such payments as payments of interest. . . . " 
Gladzcin State Bank v. Dow, 212 Mich. 521, 180 
NW 601, 13 ALR 1233, 1243. See also Citizens 
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National Bank v. Gentry, 111 Ky. 206, 63 S.W. 454, 
56 LRA 673; First Natl. Bank v. Denson, 115 Ala. 
650, 22 So. 815. 
''. . . where partial payments are made on a 
usurious loan, the bank may at any time before 
payment of the principal apply the partial pay-
ment thereto and so avoid liability for the penalty 
for taking unlawful interest." 55 Am. Jur., Usury, 
Par. 151. 
A recent case following the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in the McBroom case, is Rukavina v. Ac-
counts Supervision Corporation, 241 MA 195, 237 S.W. 
2d 503, 508. 
Bayou cannot assert that it has been damaged until 
it has at least paid back a sum equal to the amount of 
principal it received. 
POINT 4 
A DISCOUNT IS NOT SUBJECT TO BEING TREBLED. 
If it be assumed there was usury, and that payments 
cannot be allocated to principal, the only interest pay-
ment to be trebled would be a portion of the monthly in-
stalment payments. The discount was never "paid" nor 
is it "interest," both of which are required for any treble 
damages under 15-1-7 UCA 1953 as amended: 
"In case the greater rate of interest has been 
paid, the person by whom it has been paid ... 
may recover back three times the amount of the 
interest thus paid from the receiver or taker there-
of and reasonable attorney's fees ... " 
Assuming, as Judge Hanson did, that Frank Nelson's 
cancellation of Bayou's note for $15,000 was a sham and 
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an effort 011 ~elson'~ part to disguise the fact that Bayou 
had not n·<·Pi vPd the full $65,000, then the substance of 
the transaction, regardless of the form it may have had, 
wa~ that plaintiff discounh•d the loan. That might 1nake 
the loan usurious, but would not constitute a payment 
by I ~a you subject to being trebled. If Bayou paid $15,000 
wlu.•n• did it gPt it~ It had no funds. It's only source was 
plni ntiff's loan. If it in fact received the $15,000 and paid 
it back, there would be no discount, and therefore no 
usury at all. The only thing that might make the loan 
usurious is a discount. Bayou is most illogical in assert-
ing that the loan is usurious because it was discounted 
$1:-l,OOO and asserting, at the same time, that it actually 
paid out that same $15,000, and that very discount should 
lw trebled along with the trebling of installment pay-
ments allocable to interest, under our statute which 
trC'bles only interest paid. 
" ... the requirement of actual payment is not 
satisfied by the circumstance that when the evi-
dence of the debt was executed and the loan made, 
a usurious discount was reserved. Deductions by 
way of a discount when money for a loan is ad-
vanced are not treated as payments, because they 
do not come out of the debtor's pocket, even 
though they lessen the amount which he receives, 
and even though when sued for the amount ad-
vanced he may plead usury and escape liability 
for the amount thus charged and retained. . . ." 
53Am. Jur. Usury, Par. 149. Brown v. Marion 
National Bank, 169 U.S. 416, ±2 L. Ed. 801 18 S. 
Ct. 390, Citizens National Bank v. Forman' (Citi-
zens National Bank v. Gentry) 111 Kentucky 206, 
63 S. \V. 454, 56 LRA 673. 
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If anything is to be trebled it should only be pay-
ments allocable to interest, and not the amount of any 
discount. 
POINT 5 
THE USURY LAWS OF UTAH ARE UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL. 
15-1-2 UCA 1953, as amended, provides, in part: 
"15-1-2. MAXIMUM RATES. - The par-
ties to any contract may agree in writing for the 
payment of interest for the loan or forebearance 
of any money, goods or things in action, not to 
exceed ten per cent per annum; provided: 
* * * 
" (d) That licensees under the Utah Small 
Loan Act may contract for and receive interest 
at the rates and subject to the limitations pro-
vided in chapter 10, Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 
1953; 
* * * 
"(f) That industrial loan corporation may 
contract for and receive interest and charges at 
the rates subject to the limitations contained in 
chapter 8, Title '7, Utah ·Code Annotated 1953; 
"(g) That any corporation, except small loan 
licensees, operating under the supervision of the 
state banking department of Utah, and any na-
tional bank or federal savings and loan associa-
tion doing business in the state may add to or de-
duct in advance from the proceeds of any loan re-
payable in installments over a period of not more 
than 63 months and not exceeding $5,000.00 in 
principal amount, interest or discount at a rate 
not exceedi~g seven per cent per annum upon the 
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principal amount of the loan for the entire period 
therE· of; ... " 
This ~tatute purports to "protect" sophisticated bor-
rowPrs like Bayou, a corporation organized and operated 
t n makP a profit, from high interest rates, instead of 
.. proh•d i ng" unsophisticated lower economic income 
groups such as small loan borrowers, who can be charged 
high rates. 
The statute also has the effect of permitting the 
general lending public to charge a maximum of 10%, 
while at thl' same time it creates favored lending classes 











Banks and SavingJS 
and Loans, 
7-9- 2 Reasonable rates 
7-9-11 as provided by 
directors, 
Reasonable 
Deduct 1% per month 37% 
7-8-3 in advance plus other 
charges 
Deduct 7% per annum 14ro 
15'-1-2 in advance 
In addition thereto, other acts allow other favored lend-
Prs to charge the following percentages: 
Pawnbrokers', 11-6-2 5% per month for 
6 months 60% 
Conditional Seller, 15-l-2a 1% per month times 
number of months of 
contract 24% 
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This variation violates the provisions of Article I, 
Section 24, of the Utah Constitution, which provides: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uni-
form operation." 
A recent case construing this provision was Justice 
vs. Standard Gilsonite Company, 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P. 
2d 97 4. There the court held that an act which provided 
for a penalty for failure to pay wages within 24 hours 
after demand therefor was unconstitutional in its arbi-
trary exclusion of banks and mercantile houses from its 
provisions. The court said that the preferential treatment 
of banks was unreasonable. Applying this reasoning of 
the Justice case to usury, the preferential treatment of 
banks concerning permissible interest charges is un-
reasonable. There is no more reason to allow a bank to 
charge 14% interest under 15-1-2 than there is to allow 
a life insurance company or any other company or indi-
vidual to do so. The State of Washington has so held. 
In a similar situation where a statute provided for a 
maximum rate of 12%, but provided that banks, etc., 
should be excepted therefrom, the act was held unconsti-
tutional because it granted special privileges. Acme Fi-
nance Company v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P. 2d 341,348. 
The court said: 
"·Consolidating these sections and reducing 
the matter to its lowest terms, we have, remain-
ing, a law which says, in effect : Any persons, 
firm or corporation, except a bank, trust company, 
building and loan association, credit union, in-
dustrial loan company, licensed pawnbroker, one 
making casual loans of his own money, or a retail 
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merchant selling under conditional sales con-
tra(·t~, who, by any Inethod, including the receipt 
of diseount~, or by making service or carrying 
charges or examination fees, charges a greater 
rate of interest than 12 per cent per annum simple 
inten'st on loans of $300 or less, shall be guilty 
of a gross misdemeanor, ... 
'~It seems to us that a mere statement of the 
matter is all that is required to show that the act, 
or, more accurately speaking, what remains of it, 
is unlawfully discriminatory. The excepted classes 
are so numerous and varied and cover such a 
broad field that the act, in fact, does not have the 
semblance of a general law, but of a special one 
aimed at a special and limited class. It clearly 
denies to that class the equal protection of the 
laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Alnendment to the Federal Constitution, because, 
among other things, it permits the classes excepted 
by section 14 the right to collect service and 
carrying charges, etc., over and above the lawful 
12 per cent interest rate, and provides a criminal 
penalty for all others who do so. By the same 
token, it grants to the excepted classes special 
privileges and immunities in violation of Article 
1, Sec. 12, of the State Constitution. There is no 
warrant for so arbitrary a classification, especi-
ally in a criminal statute. The injury done by a 
usurious loan is the same when the loan is made 
by a bank or trust company or a licensed pawn-
broker as when made by any one else." 
The Utah act also creates special privileges and is 
like·wise unconstitutional. Utah's differentiation as to 
interest rates, depending on what lender is involved, is 
based upon no real difference in situation and circum-
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stances. For example, Utah credit unions and savings 
and loans get preferential treatment. It has been argued 
that higher charges by such institutions are justified by 
the fact that they are cooperatives with benevolent ob-
jectives. Assuming high interest rates are bad, however, 
the fact that they are charged by a mutual institution is 
no justification therefor, if the following reasoning has 
any validity: 
"The Legislature has suspended the general 
law in regard to usury for the benefit of the appel-
lant, seemingly to promote the benevolent objects 
in view. The profit made does not ultimately bene-
fit all the stockholders. Those who can live with-
out borrowing from the association, and whose 
stock is not liable to be forfeited for the nonpay-
ment of dues, will ultimately realize the large 
profits resulting from such usurious loans at the 
expense of those who have paid from twenty to 
fifty per cent for the use of the money. The fact 
that the money is loaned by the corporation to one 
of its members can make no difference. The entire 
transaction is against the letter and the spirit of 
the statute against usury." 
Henderson Building and Loan Association v. 
Johnson, 88 Ky. 191, 10 S.W. 787, 788. 
Nebraska has recognized that preferential treatment 
of a conditional seller is unreasonable and unconstitu-
tional special legislation. Stanton v. JJfattson, 175 Neb. 
767, 123 NW 2d 844 involved the constitutionality of the 
Nebraska conditional sales act providing for a 12% rate 
on conditional sales, which was in excess of the 9% 
general usury rate. Nebraska has a constitutional pro-
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vi~ion ~imilnr to tiH' Utah provision prohibiting special 
laws n·~ulatin~ intPn·~t. T·he Nebraska provision is 
Artidt> Ill, Sec. 1S, of the Constitution which provides, 
in part: 
"The Legislature shall not pass local or spe-
cial laws in any of the following cases, that is to 
say: ... regulating the interest on money." 
rrhe Nebraska court held the conditional sales act uncon-
stitutional as being special legislation on several grounds, 
among whirh was the ground that there can be no valid 
distinetion between interest rates on secured and unse-
cured loans. The court said : 
''It is provided in Sec. 1 ( 5) of Legislature 
Bill811, in part, as follows : 
'Retail installment contract or contracts shall 
mean an agreement . . . pursuant to which . . . a 
liPn upon the goods is retained ... by the seller 
as security for the payment of the retail install~ 
ment contract' . . . . 
·~Legislative Bill 811 is an interest statute. 
"\V e fail to see any connection between the fixing 
of an interest rate and the fact that security for 
the loan is taken or the title to the property re-
tained. The provision is special and not general. 
It therefore is inhibited by Article III, Sec. 18, of 
the N~braska constitution." 
Ftah has a similar exception to 15-1-2 as a subpara-
graph 15-1-:.2a which allows a conditional seller to charge 
a higher rate of interest than a seller who either has no 
sPrurity or takes other security, which likewise is special 
legislation. 
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Nebraska had separate successive statutes. The prior 
one set a general usury rate of 9% ( 45-101 Revised Stat-
utes Nebraska Cumulative Supplement 1961). A later 
separate act (Laws of Nebraska 1963 p. 805) provided 
. for a higher rate for a conditional seller, "notwithstand-
ing the provisions of any other law." Unlike Nebraska, 
Utah's general rate and exception thereto for conditional 
sellers were created by one act, Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 
1953, the title to which is as follows: 




"AN ACT TO AMEND· SE:CTION 15-1-2, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 19·53, RELATING TO 
MAXIMUM RATES; AND ENACTING A 
NEW SECTION TO BE KNOWN AS SEC-
·TION 15-1-2a, UTAH 'GOD·E ANNOTATED 
1953; PROVIDING FOR THE REHULA-
TION OF CONTRACTS FOR THE CONDI-
TIONAL SALE OF TANGIBLE PERSON-
AiL PROPERTY AND PROVIDING FOR 
THE MAXIMUM RATES TO BE CHARG-
ED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND 
PROVIDING PE·NALTIES FOR VIOLA-
TIONS." 
Therefore, whereas Nebraska h_eld only the separate act 
creating the exception to be invalid as special legislation, 
Utah's usury law within its own framework creates spe-
cial situations, so that instead of having only invalid ex-
ceptions, Utah has an invalid act. This is similar to the 
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~ituat ion in Jnstice u. Standard Gilsonite Company, 12 
(!tah ~d :~~>7, 366 P. ~d 97-l:, where the gilsonite company, 
whieh was not one of those favored by being in an ex-
('Pp!Pd cah·gory, established the invalidity of the entire 
<Wt relating to wages because the act unreasonably ex-
<'t•ph•<l hank~, etc. In the case at bar, the life insurance 
eompany, whieh is not one of those favored by being in an 
l'XePpted category, seeks to establish the invalidity of the 
entire act relating to interest, because the act unreason-
ably excepts hanks, etc. The fact that one deals with 
wages and another with interest may be pointed out by 
Bayou as a distinction. It is a difference, but an imma-
h•rial difference. The court's reasoning is applicable to 
both cases. 
In addition to the express prohibition of enactment 
of special laws relating to interest on money, Article VI, 
~~.·etion :ZG, provides: 
"In all cases where a general law can be ap-
plicable, no special law shall be enacted." 
There can certainly be no argument with the proposition 
that a general1naximum interest rate can be applicable to 
all situations. The various special exceptions to favored 
lenders is a clear violation of this provision. 
Tennessee and Kentucky have both ruled on similar 
provisions : 
~~ Tennessee constitutional provision that interest 
rates shall be uniform throughout the state and a consti-
tutional requirement of equality and uniformity both pre-
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elude the legislature from empowering the charging of a 
higher rate of interest by Small Loan Act companies only. 
In Family Loan Company v. Hickeson, 168 Tenn. 36, 73 
SW 2d 694, 94 A.L.R. 664, 666, the court said: 
"The Legislature could not clothe small loan 
companies with the right to uniformly charge all 
borrowers the maximum fees of 3 per cent per 
month, in addition to interest on all loans. Had the 
act been open to no construction other than that 
it conferred power upon loan companies to charge 
the maximum fee without reference to the service 
rendered, it would have been the duty of the court 
to declare the act void because violative of article 
11, Sec. 7, of the Constitution, and because un-
reasonably discriminatory against other money 
lenders." 
A special statute authorizing a corporation to charge 
a higher interest rate than that allowed by the general 
law was held to be unconstiutional in Kentucky. Gordon 
v. Winchester Building and Accumulating Fund Asso-
ciation, 75 Ky 110, 23 Am. Rep. 713. 
Plaintiff does not have to rely on the above general 
provisions, however, because the constitution has speci-
fically covered 18 particular categories wherein there is a 
specific prohibition against special treatment. Among 
these 18 topics is usury. Article VI, Section 26, provides, 
in part: 
"The Legislature is prohibited from enacting 
any private or special laws in the following cases: 
• • • 
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"9. HP~ulating the interest on money. 
"10. 
"11. Regulating county and township af-
fairs." 
"12. 
Our supren1e court has had occasion to consider 
whether or not various acts relating to the 11th category 
have hl't'n "special laws." In State v. Standford, 24 Utah 
148, titi P. 1061, the court held unconstitutional an act 
whi<'h was applicable only to some counties, because it 
did not have uniform operation throughout the State. 
The court said: 
"The state legislature is forbidden to pass any 
private or special laws regulating county affairs. 
The laws enacted must be uniform generally, and 
applicable to all of the counties throughout the 
state. In Welsh v. Bramlet, supra, it is said: 
'\Vhenever it attempts to enact a law for one or 
1nore of the counties of the state upon subjects 
that it is directed to provide for by general laws, 
or which are to form part of a uniform system for 
the whole state, whether such counties are desig-
nated directly by nan1e, or by reference to a class 
into which they have. been placed for other sub-
jects of legislation, it infringes these provisions of 
the constitution .... " 
In Lehi City v. JI eiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530, 
5-!7, ~I r. Justice \Y olfe in his concurring opinion, said: 
"The Legislature could not pass an act spe-
cifically directed at Salt Lake City or some other 
particular municipality." 
In State r. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 898, 
the court said that the constitution 
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" requires that all laws shall operate uni-
formly wherever uniform laws can be enacted. 
While it is true that this court, in common with 
others, has repeatedly held that legislative sub-
jects may be classified and that legislative classi-
fication should not be interferred with by the 
courts unless such classification is clearly fanci-
ful, capricious, arbitrary, or unnatural, yet, where 
such is the case, it becomes the duty of the courts 
to uphold the constitutional rights and privileges 
in that regard." 
In Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 375 
P. 2d 756, the court held the Civic Auditorium Act to be 
an unconstitutional special law, saying: 
"As to the contention that the act violates 
Art. XI, sec. 5, prohibiting special laws to create 
municipal corporations, Art. VI, sec. 26, dealing 
with limited powers of the legislature, saying that 
where a general law can be applicable, no special 
law is enactable, and Art. I, sec. 24, providing that 
general laws must have uniform operation, we 
have the following to say : 
"The act provides for a commission to operate 
an auditorium in counties having over 250,000 
population. 
". . . Although dealing with constitutional 
problems concerning county government, we think 
the reasoning of State ex rel. Wright v. Stand ford 
apropos here. There the act held unconstitutional 
provided for inspectors in counties having 5,000 
or more fruit trees and for deputies in counties 
having over 20,000 population. We had this to say: 
". . . 'The Act was doubtless intended to 
apply . . . to certain particular counties, to the 
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Pxdusion of othurs . . . The act is therefore not 
uniform throughout the state,' ... " 
..~:\ pplying the rPmwning of the Standford, Lehi and 
B:u·kmnn ca~P~ to the ~Hh (•ategory, instead of to counties 
nndPr tlw 11th category, the usury law is special legis-
lation lwl'aUSP of its various rates for various lenders 
dt'pPnding upon what hat the lender wears. 
Our Supreme Court has already ruled that the In-
dustrial Loan Act is a special act in Peoples Finance & 
Thrift ComJ)(lll!J v. Var11cy, 7·5 Utah 355, 285 P. 30-±, 305. 
The court was there attempting to ascertain whether the 
then general1naxhnum rate of 12% should be applicable 
to loans made by an Industrial Loan Company or whether 
the higher ratP permitted by the Industrial Loan Act 
should be given effect. The court expressly noted that 
the constitutionality of the Industrial Loan Act of 1925 
was not bP being questioned and then gave effect to the 
Industrial Loan Act interest provision because it was a 
special act. The court said: 
.. . . . If such an interpretation be not in har-
mony with the general usury statute, then it is 
more reasonable to hold that the L€gislature, by 
the statute of 1925, intended, so far as the general 
usury statute may apply to industrial loan com-
panies as defined by the act of 1925, to make an 
exception to the general usury statute, or, in so 
far as powers ·were conferred on such companies 
to n1ak:e loans, to regard them not as coming un-
der, or as being controlled by, the general usury 
statute. The validity of the 1925 act is not chal-
lenged. Thus, should there be a conflict between 
the general statute and the 1925 act, the former 
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must give way to the latter, which is a special 
and subsequent act, and which expressly repeals 
'all laws in conflict' therewith." 
If it were not for the decision in Justice v. Starndard 
Gilsonite Co., (supra), it might well be argued that the 
special exceptions to the general 10% limitation should 
be held invalid, but the 10% limitation should nevertheless 
be valid. The Justice case, however, holds that the 
entire act is void. There the entire act requiring pay-
ment of wages within 24 hours was held void because 
banks were excluded from the statute. The court did not 
hold that the exceptions did not apply. So here, 15-1-2 
contains discriminatory exceptions and the entire act is 
therefore void. 
The following article shows that government regula-
tion of interest rates has little to justify it either eco-
nomically or morally: 
"In the United States usury is a statutory 
matter, and usurious rates are determined by 
reference to specific statutes. Although historic-
ally the term usury was synonymous with interest 
and applied to any cost paid for the use of money, 
the need for capital led to a narrowing of the defi-
nition to the charging of interest by a lender in 
excess of a legally prescribed rate. In early Egypt 
the maximum rate was set by law at 30%, and in 
the heyday of the Roman Empire, 50% was not 
considered excessive. The trend toward freedom 
of interest rates suffered a reverse during the 
Middle Ages, when money lenders became asso-
ciated by a church-dominated society with wicked-
ness and avarice. However, with the reappear-
ance and further development of economics as a 
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~eienm·, mo~t nations in \V estern Europe and five 
Amerieun states by the end of the 19th century 
had abandoned any serious atten1pts at interest 
n·~triction. rrhe umximum-rate principle was re-
tained in the great majority of states, however, 
and today 10 jurisdictions have maxin1um lawful 
contract rates of 6o/o, 26 range from 7% to 11%, 
and 13 states allow 12% or more, including those 
with no limit." 
"One of the basic tenets of a free enterprise 
economy is that buyers and sellers, borrowers 
and lenders, are expected to compete in open mar-
kets for goods and services, including those of 
a financial nature, and indeed, apart from usury 
legislation of the type to be considered here, con-
ventional mortgage interest rates are determined 
almost completely by market conditions. 
'" \Vhen there is a shortage of something, the 
price of it goes up. Interest rates, of which mort-
gage rates are an important part, represent, the 
price paid by the borrower for the use of the lend-
er's money. Rates in the money market are not 
set by any diabolical collusion among banks, sav-
ings associations, or other lenders ; when the na-
tion as a whole decides to spend more money on 
goods than can be financed out of the current 
flow of savings, interest rates go up. While the 
principle is well understood in the financial com-
munity, it unfortunately is true that this economic 
fact is not fully understood by some legislators 
and a large segment of the public. . . . 
"Some say that morality enters into the mat-
ter of determining the amount of interest to be 
paid. obviously this is true, but it also is true that 
a maximum-interest-rate law cannot be con-
sidered to be a declaration of any valid moral law. 
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If the collection of interest on money lent is moral 
at all, it does not cease to be moral at 6%. Indeed, 
it would be hard to reconcile any such theory with 
the conclusion that the 30% maximum interest 
rate legal in Rhode Island is moral, while any 
excess over the legal 6% rate in the neighboring 
state of New York is immoral. 
"·That arbitrary rate ceilings have little to do 
with morality is demonstrated by their across-the-
board applicability and their general failure to 
make any exception based upon the ability or wil-
lingness to pay. A man who borrows not from 
need but from an incentive to accumulate more 
money has the same rate ceiling applied to his 
loan as the unemployed man who borrows to buy 
food. Any alleged morality of rate-fixing also be-
comes horned in some states on the dilemma of the 
large versus the 'small' loan. In Illinois, for ex-
ample, small loans may bear interest of 36%, 
whereas 'large' loans generally are limited to 7%. 
Considered from the moral aspect of need, the 
person unable to offer security for a larger loan 
ordinarily is a much needier individual than the 
person who can. Yet for this needier individual 
a 36% rate is legal (hence moral) while for the 
larger borrower 8% is illegal (hence immoral). 
Morality as applied to a business corporation con-
tracting voluntarily to pay a specified rate for its 
use of borrowed money is another nonsequitur; 
fortunately this has been recognized by statute in 
21 states where corporations have been excepted 
from application of the usury laws. Although 
morality may be associated with excessive rate, it 
fails to follow that a rate ceiling applicable to all 
parties at all times is a manifestation of that 
morality. 
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'"It. is trtw that price ceilings under some cir-
('.umstmwl'~ cause little trouble. For exrunple, a 
p ri<'P ceiling of $1.00 a point placed on butter 
would ~ause little concern today among the butter 
V\'ndors. This is true because the current price 
is approximately 70c a pound. If demand in-
cn·a~Pd, however, or the supply dwindled, the 
price ceiling overnight could become important. 
"This is precisely what has happened in the 
ease of rate ceilings placed on mortgage lending 
by interest-rate limitations and the usury laws 
in several eastern states. Having remained on 
the books without change since the early days of 
the republic when the economy was largely agri-
cultural, a state usury law which fixes the rate 
celing at 6% appears to be as anachronistic today 
a8 the date of the legislation bears. The result 
is a bittt>r paradox, since the ceilings which were 
intended to help and protect the borrower succeed 
only in drying up his local sources of money; 
lenders will turn elsewhere, where the rates are 
more realistic. 
"\Yhile possibly justifiable in times of na-
tional emergency, it can be seen that arbitrary 
price-fL~ing, both from the economic and the moral 
standpoints, represents a philosophy generally 
at odds with the concept of a private-enterprise, 
peact>time economy. Indeed, when the price-fixing 
is allo,ved to prevail at unrealistic levels the de-
leterious effects upon the economy can be severe." 
[~nited States Sa~·ings & Loan League Bulletin. 
July 1960, p. 125-8. 
There should, therefore, be no economic nor moral com-
punction to sustain our usuary laws. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has not directly considered 
the constitutionality of the usury statutes. Some dicta, 
however, are quoted: 
Mr. Justice Wade in a concurring opinion in Sea-
board Finance Compa.ny v. Wahlen, 123 Utah 529, 260 
P. 2d 556, 563, said : 
"It seems to be to be highly inconsistent to 
prohibit a man from charging more than 10 per 
cent interest on a loan to his neighbor or business 
acquaintance, but at the same time allow a fi-
nance company to charge 37 per cent for same 
loan." 
Mr .. Justice Henriod in a dissenting opinion in Ross-
berg v. Holesapple, 123 Utah 544, 260 P. 2d 563, 569, said: 
"One wonders what the majority would con-
clude had Rossberg obtained the money from an 
industrial loan company, when we recently ap-
proved a charge by such a company of 37% inter-
est, far in excess of the percentage involved in 
this case." 
Mr. Justice Wade in a dissenting opinion in the 
Rossberg case, (supra at 570) said: 
"Undoubtedly the statute was originally en-
acted to curb what is referred to as the loan shark 
business. It was intended to curb unconscionable 
charges made by professional lenders of money. 
But our statute, although very rigid and harsh in 
its remedy, now allows exceptions to its strict pro-
visions in favor of the very people it was original-
ly intended to curb. As we have noticed in the 
Seaboard Finance Co. case an industrial loan 
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company may eharge as much as 31% interest on 
its loan~ w i t.h iinpunity. I cannot understand how 
our u~ury ~tatute is constitutional when the evil 
which it wa~ intended to curb is expressly permit-
ted to flourish under exceptions to that statute." 
\Ye rely on the reasoning applied in the Nebraska 
en::-;P, that unr('asonable exceptions create unconstitu-
tional stwciallegislation. Combining that with the reason-
ing in the Justice case, that an act which has exceptions 
is itself invalid, the conclusion is that 15-1-2 and 2a are 
unconstitutional. 
As evidenced by national publicity given to the N e-
bra~ka decision (Time Magazine, November ____ , 19'63) 
Nebra~ka's economy is in chaos from the withdrawal of 
~wllt>rs and lenders from Nebraska because it is eco-
nomically impossible for them to do business within a 9% 
nu1 ... '{iinum rate. Such would not be the result of a deci-
sion of unconstitutionality here. A ruling of unconstitu-
tionality in this case would result in the elimination of all 
artificial economic controls aand would enable the law 
of supply and demand to operate in a free economy to set 
interest rates. 
We conclude that there is no reasonable basis for the 
many preferential special rates contained in 15-1-2 and 
15-1-2a. Kentucky was held that interest limitations 
which except cooperatives such as savings and loans 
and credit unions are unreasonable. Henderson Building 
and Loan Association v. Johnson, (supra). Washington 
has held that interest limitations which except banks, 
trust companies, building and loan associations, credit 
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unions, industrial loan companies, licensed pawn brokers, 
casual lenders and conditional sellers, are unreasonable, 
Acme Finance Comparny v. Huse (supra). Nebraska has 
held that interest limitations which except secured lenders 
are unreasonable. Stanton v. Mattson} (supra). Utah has 
the same exceptions, which, are likwise unreasonable, 
which make the interest rate unreasonably dependent 
upon who the lender is rather than such reasonable fac-
tors as need of the borrower, risk, size of loan, etc. The 
unreasonable exceptions constitute special legislation. 
Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Company (supra). 
POINT 6 
DE·FENDANT''S ATTORNEYS FEES ON IT'S OOUNTE&. 
CLAlM SHOULD BE REDUCED AS ITS AWARD ON ITS 
COUNT'ERCLAIM 118 REDUCED. 
Any reduction in recovery by Bayou in its counter-
claim should be reflected in a reduction of the atttorney's 
fee awarded Bayou, since the award of attorney's fees 
was based in part upon the amount recovered, If Bayou 
obtains no offest, it is entitled to no attorneys fees, 
since the allowance of attorneys fees is tied by our statute 
to the successful recovery of treble damages. Rukavina 
v. Accounts Sttpervision Corporation (supra). 
CONCLUSION 
Utah usury statutes are unconstitutional because 
they do not have uniform operation and are special legis-
lation, (Point 5). This requires that plaintiff's award be 
increased by the amount of accrued interest and Bayou 
should have no offsetting award on its counterclaim. 
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Furl ll\'l'lliOn', sim·p payments may be alloted by the 
lttndPr in n·dud ion of principal, Bayou must actually 
haVl' paid uwnPy out of its own pocket, rather than mere-
ly pay back funds received from plaintiff before Bayou 
should n·coVl'l' treble drunages (Point 3), which is an 
additional reason Bayou's award on its counterclaim 
~hould be eli1ninated. 
Furthermon', a discount is a reduction of the prin-
cipal advaneed by the lender, not a payment of interest 
by the borrower, and is not to be trebled and awarded 
to Bayou (Point-±). This, alone, would require a reduc-
tion of Bayou's offset on its counterclaim of treble the 
$14,500 or $43,500. 
Furthermore, there was an issue of fact as to whether 
or not Bayou received value by cancellation of its $15,000 
obligation to Nelson (Point 1) or whether or not if there 
was usury, Bayou should be estopped to assert it (Point 
~). Either would require a reversal of the award on 
Bayou's counterclaim and a remand for trial. 
If there is any reduction of Bayou's offset, its attor-
ney's fees should be reduced proportionately (Point 6). 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT "\Y. HUGHES and 
BRAYTON, LOWE & HTJRJLEY 
JOHN W. LOWE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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